This paper analyzes the roots and implications of variations in de facto institutions, within a constant de jure institutional setting. We explore the role of rent-seeking episodes in colonial Brazil as determinants of the quality of current local institutions, and argue that this variation reveals a de facto dimension of institutional quality. We show that municipalities with origins tracing back to the sugar-cane colonial cycle -characterized by a polarized and oligarchic socioeconomic structure -display today more inequality in the distribution of land. Municipalities with origins tracing back to the gold colonial cycle -characterized by an overbureaucratic and heavily intervening presence of the Portuguese state -display today worse governance practices and less access to justice. Using variables created from the rent-seeking colonial episodes as instruments to current institutions, we show that local governance and access to justice are significantly related to long-term development across Brazilian municipalities.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of variation in local institutions, within a constant 'macro-institutional' setting. We show that variation in institutional quality across Brazilian municipalities is partly inherited from the distinct colonial histories experienced by different areas of the country, and argue that some of this institutional variation conditioned regional development.
1 Specifically, we explore the role of rent-seeking colonial episodes in determining the quality of current local institutions along four very precise dimensions:
distribution of economic power through distribution of endowments, distribution of political power, quality of local government practices, and access to the justice system. Our results show that municipalities with origins tracing back to the sugar-cane colonial cycle -characterized by a polarized and oligarchic socioeconomic structure -display today more inequality in the distribution of land. Municipalities with origins connected to the gold colonial cyclecharacterized by an over-bureaucratic and heavily intervening presence of the Portuguese statedisplay today worse governance practices and less access to justice. In addition, we show that the variation in current institutions explained by colonial history is significantly related to development.
The role of institutions as key determinants of development has received increased attention in recent years. After the initial work of North (1991) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) , a vast array of cross-country empirical literature developed following the footsteps of the seminal contributions of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001 and 2002) . 2 Much of this literature has evolved around the idea that the geographic pattern of development observed across countries -summarized in the relationship between distance to the equator and income per capita reproduced here in Figure 1 -reflects different institutional arrangements, inherited from different experiences of colonization. According to the emerging consensus in this literature, geographic conditions were associated with particular paths of colonization, which in turn translated into the establishment of different types of institutions. Institutions then, through their effects on property rights, political competitiveness, and governance, led to good policies and, ultimately, development. In this view, the adoption of distinct 'macro-institutions' -determined at the country level and related to the political and judicial systems and to the enforcement of laws -would be the intervening force in the observed correlation between geography and development (see, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005 and Persson and Tabellini, 2004) .
The geographic pattern of development within Brazil raises a series of questions in relation to the interpretation of the cross-country evidence and the conclusions of this literature. Figure 2 replicates the typical scatter-plot of distance to the equator and income per capita for the case of Brazilian municipalities. As in the cross-country context, municipalities closer to the equator have systematically lower income per capita. In fact, the relationship between latitude and income is stronger and tighter within Brazil than across countries: the R 2 of this relation across Brazilian municipalities is 0.56 and the coefficient on latitude is 0.053, while across countries the R 2 is 0.32 and the coefficient is 0.038 (cross-country data from the Penn World
Tables; municipality data presented in section 3). As will be seen later on, the geographic pattern of development within Brazil is even more striking than this simple scatter-plot reveals. A more complete set of geographic variables can explain up to 65% of the variation in income per capita across municipalities (Table 1 , in section 3, presents this result). At the same time, Brazil is a country that shares a single colonizer and a single language, and has a very centralized federal system. The 'macro-institutions' typically highlighted in the interpretation of the cross-country evidence, as well as the historical variables identified as their sources of variation, are, and for the most part have always been, constant within the territory (constraints on executive, legal system, competitiveness of political system, colonizing power, legal tradition, etc). 3 Therefore, the pattern observed within Brazil challenges the understanding that the correlation between geography and development reflects mostly the effect of climate and endowments on the type of 'macro-institutions' that were ultimately adopted at the country level.
Two non-mutually exclusive possibilities arise from this challenge: geographic factors may be important on their own as direct determinants of long-term development, which would contradict the main consensus of the institutional literature; or, even within a constant de jure setting, different geographic characteristics may still be associated with different de facto institutional arrangements, which would then be relevant determinants of local development.
In this paper, we focus on the second possibility. As will be seen in section 3, various dimensions of quality of local institutions within Brazil do follow a clear geographic pattern.
Given the constant 'macro-institutional' context of the country, variation in local institutions is likely to reveal the effects of changes in de facto institutions within a constant de jure institutional setting. 4 We therefore try to understand what lies behind the de facto variation in institutions revealed by the municipality data, and ask whether this variation has any significant implication for long-term development. Though the recent literature has acknowledged the difference between de jure and de facto institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, and Pande and Udry, 2006) , it has yet been unable to empirically distinguish between them and to identify the sources and consequences of variations in the latter.
Specifically, we identify the areas of Brazil that were actively involved in two of its most well-known colonial 'cycles:' the 'sugar-cane cycle' and the 'gold cycle.' The sugar-cane and gold cycles were the main periods of economic expansion during Brazilian colonial history, both associated with the initial occupation of certain areas and intrinsically connected to the development of rent-seeking activities by the colonial power (Portugal). These so-called 'colonial cycles' can be delimited both chronologically and geographically, so that some municipalities today can have their origins traced back to a specific episode of extractive enterprise. We then ask whether municipalities affected by these historical episodes have worse institutions today, and whether the institutional consequences of the colonial cycles seem to have affected development.
Our analysis concentrates on four dimensions of local institutions: distribution of economic power, as related to the distribution of endowments (land) across the local population; concentration of political power, measured by the fraction of votes to the leading candidate in mayoral elections; access to justice, measured by the local availability of courts; and quality of local governance practices, measured by the municipality's administrative efficiency. Each one of these dimensions tries to capture a different way through which local institutional development may manifest itself. A perverse initial distribution of economic power may lead to poor de facto institutions, irrespective of the formalities of de jure institutional arrangements.
Concentration of power may also be reflected in the political system, where oligarchies may effectively control the electoral process even under a seemingly democratic environment. Access to justice may capture the relevance and penetration of the rule of law, and the willingness of the state to protect contracts and property rights. And finally, local governance practices may reflect the efficiency of the local government in the provision of public goods and its potential responsiveness to demands of the local population.
Our results show that areas affected by the rent-seeking cycles of the colonial period, and under stronger influence of Portugal during that time, have systematically worse institutions today. The specific way in which each historical episode affects current institutions also agrees with their socioeconomic and political characteristics, giving additional credibility to our results.
Particularly, municipalities with origins linked to the socially polarized and oligarchic economy of the sugar-cane cycle are characterized today by higher concentration of land. Municipalities with origins connected to the gold cycle -with its suffocating and over-bureaucratic and controlling state -have today worse governance practices and less access to justice. In both the sugar-cane and gold episodes, the negative consequences of the colonial cycles are significantly worse the closer the municipalities are to Portugal, highlighting the negative influence of the interference of the metropolis, particularly when associated with rent-seeking activities.
Once we use our variables related to colonial history to instrument for these different institutional dimensions, and analyze the impact of instrumented institutions on current development, we find that better governance practices and better access to justice are both associated with higher income per capita.
The quantitative implications of our results are also of interest. For example, if the average city in the historical mining areas had not been affected by the gold cycle, its index of governance today would be better by 10% of a standard deviation, while its index of access to justice would improve by 16% of a standard deviation. Similarly, if the average municipality in the sugar-cane area had not been affected by the sugar cycle, its index of concentration of land today would be smaller by 50% of a standard deviation. Our most robust results imply that an exogenous improvement in governance practices within the municipal administration from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of the observed distribution would lead, in the long-run, to an increase of 83% in income per capita. An analogous movement in the observed distribution of access to justice would lead to an increase of 50% in income per capita. To give some perspective into the relevance of these numbers, the difference in income per capita between municipalities in the 25 th and 75 th percentiles of the income distribution corresponds to 170%.
The empirical literature has recently stressed the need and advantages of bringing the institutional discussion to the within country context, highlighting the minimization of problems of omitted variables and comparability of institutional arrangements, and the gains from the potential identification of more specific dimensions of institutions (Iyer, 2003 , Banerjee and Iyer, 2004 , and Jimeno 2005 . Several recent papers have taken advantage of these benefits and analyzed the interaction between institutions, colonial history, and development within countries (Iyer, 2003 , Mitchener and McLean, 2003 , Berkowitz and Clay, 2004 , Banerjee and Iyer, 2004 , Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan, 2004 , Jimeno, 2005 , Lagerlöff, 2005 , Bonet and Roca, 2006 , and Bruhn and Gallego, 2006 . This paper contributes to the literature by identifying determinants of variation in current local institutions, and by linking this variation to differences in long-term development. The original contributions of our approach can be summarized in four points. First, we are able to measure very specific dimensions of local institutions, within the constant 'macro-institutional' framework of Brazilian society. This allows us to avoid the general and imprecise measures of 'institutional quality' typically used in cross-country studies, and to explicitly identify current institutional variation within a country. Given the extreme centralization of the Brazilian federal system, this variation reveals a dimension of de facto institutional quality that had not yet been analyzed in previous empirical studies. 5 Second, instead of looking at broad historical patterns and analyzing their correlation with current economic performance, we focus on particular historical events. These events can be precisely characterized in terms of their political and socioeconomic environments, and therefore in terms of their likely institutional consequences.
Third, we suggestively identify the local institutions most closely related to economic success.
Among the institutions examined, quality of governance within the local administration and access to justice seem to be the most relevant determinants of long-run development. And lastly, we account for a wide range of geographic characteristics -distance to the equator and to the coast, sunshine, rainfall, altitude, average temperature in each of the twelve months of the year, and types of soil -therefore measuring in a more accurate way the specific endowments of a well defined and limited area (municipality). This allows us to isolate the effect of institutions from that of geography and, indeed, to treat geography in a much more careful way than that usually seen in the cross-country literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the historical episodes that we analyze, highlighting their chronological period, the types of economic activities involved, and the social, political, and economic structures that evolved from them.
Section 3 explains in detail the construction of our historical variables and describes the data on local institutions, as well as the other datasets used in the paper (geographic and economic variables). Section 4 analyzes the impact of the rent-seeking episodes of colonial Brazil on the quality of current local institutions. Section 5 presents the results on the effects of local institutions on long-term development. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
The Sugar-Cane and Gold Cycles in Brazilian Colonial History
Brazil has a very heterogeneous territory and its various regions have quite distinct colonial histories. The impact of the colonial past on current characteristics depends therefore on the possibilities that geographic location and natural resources offered to the economic interests of the metropolis, and on the type of colonial institutions that were implemented at the local level.
Between 1500 and 1822, Brazil was a colony of Portugal. Through most of the colonial period, Portuguese rule was characterized by the establishment of successive waves of assumedly extractive endeavors, varying in form and institutional characteristic according to the goods being demanded in Europe and to the production possibilities offered by the colony. In the first years of colonization, the main economic activity was the extraction of "pau-brasil," a type of wood that was obtained primarily through barter and exchange with the native population.
When Portugal finally decided to occupy and systematically explore Brazil (circa 1530), a system of 'Hereditary Captaincies' was established, dividing the colony into fifteen equally spaced latitudinal stretches of land, each under the rule of an appointed 'captain' (HGCB, 1968) .
Though the system of Hereditary Captaincies was short-lived, it marked the beginning of the systematic exploitation of Brazil as an effective source of economic rent. Following, a sequence of 'colonial cycles' was inaugurated, involving at different historical moments and locations the production of various commodities, such as sugar-cane, gold, rubber, tobacco, cocoa, and cotton, among others.
During the first centuries of colonization, proximity to Portugal was an extremely important characteristic. For this reason, and also because of its climatic features, the Northeast was the area first occupied by the metropolis, and throughout the colonial period it had its economic destiny closely linked to decisions coming directly from Portugal. The Southern part did not suffer such direct and constant intervention, and its history was more related to the economic activities developed by settlers, at the margin of the colonial enterprises supported by the metropolis. Overall, the costs and difficulties related to trade with Portugal constituted an important determinant of the variation in the degree of intervention suffered by each area of the colony. Wheling (1994, p.302 , translated by the authors), for example, claims that "The physical distance between Lisbon, the main centre of political and administrative decisions, and the coastal cities of Brazil, and from these coastal cities to the countryside, turned into months or years the timing of decisions (...). It imposed, therefore, an 'administrative time' that delayed decisions and limited the efficacy of the government apparatus."
In general, the goods that constituted valuable commodities for the Portuguese were determined by the European demand. Local climatic and geographic conditions, together with distance to Portugal, determined the viability of the different potential activities in the Brazilian territory and their location. Contrary to the situation in parts of the Spanish America, there were no complex societies or densely populated areas in Brazil prior to the arrival of the Portuguese.
Therefore, there was very little impact of previously existing social arrangements or labor supply on decisions regarding the location of production. In this sense, both the activities being developed and their location in the Brazilian territory can indeed be understood as shocks to the economic and political history of the country. If the local institutional setting associated with the rent-seeking activities established by the metropolis persisted through time, in principle it would be possible to capture its long-term effects still today.
In this sense, among the extractive activities developed by Portugal, two deserve particular attention: sugar-cane plantations and gold mining (see, for example, Simonsen, 1937) .
Even though the idea of colonial cycles implies inevitably some degree of oversimplification, there were periods when these activities were clearly hegemonic in terms of concentration of efforts of the metropolis. Therefore, it is possible to identify the height of the rent-seeking episodes of sugar-cane production and gold extraction, and to circumscribe them geographically and chronologically.
Though there were other colonial cycles in Brazil, we concentrate our analysis on sugarcane and gold for three main reasons: they are typically regarded as the most important ones, both in terms of economic relevance and area of influence; they were characterized by an essentially extractive socioeconomic organization and an openly rent-seeking logic; and they marked the initial occupation of important areas of the territory. For these reasons, these will constitute the historical episodes that we will analyze in order to try to identify the long-term determinants of local institutions, and their impact on development.
During their most prosperous periods, both sugar-cane and gold mobilized the attention of Portugal, marking the initial occupation of, respectively, the Brazilian Northeast and CenterSouth. The metropolis committed its physical resources, labor, and institutional apparatus in a coordinated way in order to maximize rent extraction. Once these rents started to dwindle, even though the activity itself persisted existing, the mobilization of attention and resources was dismantled, and a new rent-seeking opportunity was sought. For example, when sugar-cane started loosing its relevance as the most dynamic economic activity and gold mines were discovered in the central part of Brazil, the capital of the colony was shifted from Salvador to Rio de Janeiro (from the Northeast to the Southeast, in 1763). The idea of cycles, therefore, relates more to the prominence of the activity within the enterprises being conducted by the metropolis, rather than to the mere existence and magnitude of the activity itself.
The extractive nature of these colonial cycles is unquestionable. 6 Occupation of the Brazilian territory, up until the early 19 th century, was driven by the extractive interests of the metropolis and conducted by settlers who were entirely engaged in the rent-seeking activity itself. 7 Reports abound about the lack of supply of basic types of food and other goods in the areas involved in both the sugar-cane and gold cycles. In the case of sugar-cane, the extensive use of plantations exclusively for sugar production led to very limited supply of any type of crop and also limited cattle. In the case of gold, locations surrounding the mining areas were entirely unprepared to receive the number of people that arrived, mostly single-mindedly after precious metals (HGCB, 1968 and Simonsen, 1937) .
Nevertheless, despite the similarities between the sugar-cane and gold cycles, each has its own characteristics and possibly distinct implications for institutional development. Following, we discuss in further detail the social, political and economic structures associated with the sugar-cane and gold cycles, and briefly suggest the consequences that they may have had for the long-run institutional development of the affected areas.
The Sugar-Cane Cycle
The initial phase of Brazilian colonization took place mainly along the Northeastern coast. Climatic factors and characteristics of the soil made the region particularly favorable to the cultivation of sugar-cane, and proximity to Portugal made it viable as a source of exports to Europe (see Figure 3 for a map of Brazilian states and the position of the country in relation to Portugal). This conjunction of factors turned the period of sugar-cane expansion in the Brazilian 6 For example, it was forbidden to make public any information on Portuguese trade and profits. In fact, the crown ordered the apprehension and destruction of publications dealing with the sugar business in the colony (see Simonsen, 1937, p.112) . Also, certain coastal areas of the Northeast were exclusively reserved for sugar-cane production, being forbidden the development of any other agricultural activity. 7 Portuguese settlers had such a short-term view of their stay in the colony that, up until the 18 th century, it was common for men to go to Brazil leaving their wives in Portugal. During this period, the number of white women in the colony was extremely scarce (Russel-Wood, 1977 and Wehling, 1994) . In relation to the sugar industry, Father Manuel da Nóbrega wrote in the 16 th century: "this people of Brazil pay attention to nothing but their 'engenhos' [sugar-mills] and wealth even though it be with the perdition of all their souls" (quoted in Schwartz, 1987, p.89 ).
Northeast into the most important economic cycle of colonial times (Fausto, 2006 , Schwartz, 1987 and Wehling, 1994 Until the 17 th century, Brazil was the main world producer of sugar (Prado Jr., 1976) . In the Northeast, sugar-cane was cultivated all along the stretch of land from the current state of Rio Grande do Norte down to the intermediary latitudes of the state of Bahia ("Recôncavo Bahiano"). The main centers were the areas that correspond today to the states of Bahia and
Pernambuco, but even less tropical states such as Espírito Santo and Rio de Janeiro were at certain points involved in production (though mostly in much smaller scales and for the production of "aguardente," the alcoholic beverage derived from sugar-cane and used in exchange for slaves in Africa; see Fausto, 2006) . According to Simonsen (1937, p.112) , there were roughly 120 sugar-mills in Brazil in 1600: 66 in Pernambuco, 36 in Bahia, and 18 in all other captaincies together.
The cultivation of sugar-cane in plantations and its processing in sugar-mills were extremely important economic activities throughout the entire Brazilian history. The activity went through various periods of expansion and contraction, but in reality never ceased to be the most important source of exports during colonial times (total value), so the idea of a cycle in this context is not self-evident. Nevertheless, it is possible to clearly identify periods of great prosperity and of serious crisis, and, most importantly, periods over which the efforts of the metropolis were geared almost entirely toward exploitation of rents from sugar. Following Simonsen (1937) , we identify the sugar cycle as the period from the beginning of the effective colonization of Brazil until 1760. This includes the so-called 'century of sugar,' the period ranging from 1570 to 1670, which was the height of production and profits in the sugar business.
From 1650 on, the value exported started to fall and, by mid 18 th century, it was already only 60% of what it had been at the height of the cycle (Simonsen, 1937) . In this sense, there was a clear movement of expansion, peak, and decline of sugar as the main rent-seeking activity sought by the metropolis between 1530 and 1760.
The economy of the sugar was based on the plantation system, built over three essential elements: the "latifundio" (a large estate of land owned by a single person), the monoculture, and slave labor. Sugar-cane brought with it the large rural estate and the patriarchal and slavery-based society not only to Brazil, but to the entire colonial America, implying an institutional and economic transformation that has sometimes been termed the 'sugar revolution' (see Higman, 2000) . Sugar-mills were enterprises that demanded a large amount of resources to be initiated at a productive scale. Therefore, land was given to individuals that had enough funds to make the most of the land in its sugar-producing potential. African slavery, then, appeared as the only possible way to extract rent in a context where the supply of land for subsistence was extremely large (Reis, 2005) . 9 The combination of these three factors appeared, from the perspective of the metropolis, as the only feasible way to explore the potential rents from sugar-cane production and processing. According to Simonsen (1937, p.126 , translated by the authors):
"The use of this 'institution' appeared, then, as an unavoidable economic imposition: industrial enterprises, the construction of mills, and expensive colonial expeditions would be allowed only if the corresponding labor supply was guaranteed in quantity and flow. And, at those times and latitudes, only slave labor could give such guarantee."
A typical sugar-mill would have between 60 and 100 slaves. A particularly large one could have more than 200 slaves. In the 18 th century, slaves represented more than half of the population in the Northeastern captaincies, and between 65% and 70% in the plantation areas. In the other extreme of the social pyramid, the "senhores de engenho" (literally, sugar-mill lords, usually translated as 'planters') constituted the local landed aristocracy, invariably white and concentrating a wide range of social, economic, and political powers (Schwartz, 1987) .
Even though in most cases there was no actual ownership of land, and therefore no formal hereditary transmission of estate (Schwartz, 1987, p.88) , possession of sugar-mills and plantations and the position of "senhor de engenho" gave enormous social prestige: "(…) the 'senhor de engenho' is a title aspired by many because it brings with it being served and respected by many. And (…) the esteem given to the landlord in Brazil is proportionate to the esteem given to noblemen in the court" (Father Antonil in 1711, quoted in Simonsen, 1937, p.105 ; translated by the authors).
In reality, the local power of the sugar-mill lords remains in strong contrast to the weak access that they had to royal power. As metropolis, Portugal restricted its control over sugar related activities to rules and devices targeting, essentially, the constancy of the flow of rents and the preservation of supremacy over the areas of interest (Schwartz, 1987 and Wehling, 1994) .
The political and institutional landscape of the time makes clear the rent-seeking nature of the activity that sustained that entire economic and political universe. Several reports call attention to the contrast between the frequent and recurrent demands for tax exemptions or debt bailouts of planters, and their extreme opulence and wealth. In the state of Pernambuco during the 17 th century, for example, about 80% of government revenues came from a series of different taxes raised over sugar production and trade, which was the only agricultural activity allowed in some areas of the coast during certain historical periods (Schwartz, 1987, p.98) .
The polarization between landlord and slave, and the dominance of the plantation system targeted at exports to Europe, constitute the foundations of the social, economic, and political structures associated with sugar production. Following closely the idea of extractive occupation discussed by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) , this particular universe within Brazil had all the elements comprising poor institutional foundations: extreme social inequality, very small economic and political elites with concentrated powers, and establishment of legal and tax systems shaped almost exclusively around extractive goals.
The Gold Cycle
The gold led mining expansion in the central part of Brazil during the colonial era was extremely intense and concentrated in time. In 1695, explorers made the first significant discoveries of gold in the areas of Sabará and Caeté, in a region that today corresponds to the state of Minas Gerais. Following, successive quarries were found in the same region and, after 1720 and 1726, also in areas corresponding to the current states of Mato Grosso and Goiás (Fausto, 2006 ; see Figure 1 ). In 1728, the first diamond quarries were found, and the height of Brazilian production soon followed in 1760. After that, production started to decline and lost most of its relevance already by the end of the 18 th century (Simonsen, 1937) .
Despite its brief lifetime, the gold cycle left permanent imprints on the economy and demography of the colony, on the colony-metropolis relationship, and on world markets. From 1700 to 1770, Brazilian gold production corresponded to the entire production of the rest of the Americas between 1492 and 1850, and to roughly 50% of the production of the rest of the world between the 16 th and 18 th centuries (Simonsen, 1937, p.258) .
The news of the discoveries generated a 'gold-rush' that led to an unprecedented occupation of the central part of the territory. After the first 25 years of the cycle, the CenterSouth region, which was mostly uninhabited prior to that, already concentrated 50% of the colonial population (Fausto, 2006) . In reality, the Portuguese crown became seriously concerned with the possibility of depopulation of the metropolis, even resorting to legal restrictions in order to limit emigration (Porto, 1967, p.70 and Costa, 1982a) . The collapse of the mining economy was similarly fast, highlighting its essentially rent-seeking nature. Despite the formation of urban centers and development of auxiliary activities surrounding the mining areas, other economic initiatives were unable to take-off as independent and profitable enterprises. So, Ouro Preto, the main urban center of the region, went from 20 thousand inhabitants in 1740 to just 7 thousand in 1804. By then, gold production in Brazil had already declined to only 12% of its peak value (Fausto, 2006 and Simonsen, 1937) .
In the colony, the main concern of the Portuguese crown was to keep the mining areas under as much control and scrutiny as possible. A series of regulations, related to exploration of precious metals, movement of goods and people, and taxation, was put in place in order to guarantee to Portugal an amount of rent deemed adequate, given the sudden wealth of the colony. In certain regions during specific periods of time, passports were required for people to be allowed to enter or leave the mining areas, but this regulation proved unenforceable and soon was dropped (Boxer, 2000) .
At least twelve distinct tax systems were adopted at different moments in time, but two were the most common ones: the fifth (or "quinto"), which established that 20% of all the gold produced in the colony belonged to the crown; and the capitation (or "capitação"), which charged a fixed fee by slave owned (above the age of 12). Gold was considered a monopoly of the Portuguese crown, and exploration depended on access to mining plots. Usually, individuals responsible for the discovery of new quarries had priority in the selection of a fraction of the relevant area, and the remainder was allocated to other candidates through auctions and lotteries, with the size varying according to the number of slaves owned. After the initial allocation, miners were free to sell or trade their plots (Boxer, 2000, p.75, and Reis, 2005 ).
Individuals were not allowed to circulate with gold in the form of powder. Processing of raw gold and its transformation into bars was used as a tool to enforce taxation, and therefore was also under tight control of the metropolis. For the most part, gold bars could only circulate with the seal of the Portuguese crown, meaning that the raw gold would have been melted in an official establishment ("Casa de Fundição") and due taxes would have been automatically paid.
Nevertheless, despite continuous efforts of Portugal, frauds were constant. The environment created in the mining regions was that of a constant race between individuals and state. As miners tried to evade the grasping hand of the Portuguese crown, the metropolis created more and increasingly oppressive devices to regulate and control production even further. The natural development of this process was the creation of a very heavy and ineffective state apparatus, and the emergence of an extremely antagonistic environment between state and civilsociety. 10 The height of this tension was materialized in the "derrama," an additional tax raised when the aggregate amount of gold collected by the crown as one-fifth of total production did not reach a certain pre-established goal. 11 The "derrama" was raised from the entire population as a tax on virtually any type of activity (trade, ownership of business or slaves, use of public roads, etc.) and also as a tax on wealth, based on more or less arbitrary assessments of personal assets. Tax collection when the "derrama" was actually installed, which might last for several months, made extensive use of the army and involved prisons, apprehension of personal assets and durable goods, and raids into private households (Prado Jr., 1976) .
Still, the mining areas were also peculiar in other important ways. Despite the widespread use of slaves, society was not as polarized as that of the sugar-cane regions. Technology and the scale of production implied a certain degree of horizontality in the social organization of the gold economy. According to Simonsen (1937, p.291 , translated by the authors):
"The miner needed courage, some tools, and a handful of slaves. (…) While the sugar lord needed vast resources to start his business, the alluvium miner could be a man of little wealth. Despite the fact that slave labor was used as the main source of manpower, it is undeniable that a much more intense 'division of labor' developed in the mining areas than could be supported by the social organization in the sugarcane areas of the Brazilian Northeast." Furtado (1991, p.74 , translated by the authors) highlights the almost technological nature of this social organization: "(...) the mining economy in Brazil opened possibilities to people with limited resources, since exploration was not based on large and deep mines -as in the case of silver in Peru and Mexico -but on alluvium metal deposited in the bottom of rivers."
The actual work performed by slaves was considered more intense and harsher than that performed in the plantations, but the relation between slave and slave-owner was essentially 10 The antagonistic environment between society and state in the mining areas is illustrated in a series of anecdotal tales from colonial Brazil. The most celebrated independency movement before 1822 was the "Inconfidência Mineira," a movement organized by the local elites in 1789 in the state of Minas Gerais, and planned to burst out on a day scheduled for tax collection. The movement was frustrated by the early warnings of a traitor (rewarded with the cancellation of his debts to the crown). The efforts to smuggle gold out of the mining areas involved entire local communities. For example, a figure that became entrenched in Brazilian popular culture is that of the 'hollow-saints' ("santos do pau-oco"), hollow wooden images of catholic saints. These images were used by the various religious orders active in the area to smuggle powder gold out of the colony. In reality, because of the widespread use of 'hollow-saints,' in 1711 the Portuguese crown forbid the entrance of priests without explicit authorization and the establishment of religious orders in the state of Minas Gerais (Boxer, 2000, p.76 ; for a general description of the relation between the miners and the Portuguese state, see Costa, 1982b) . 11 The use of the "derrama" became more common with the decline in gold production. The minimum amount required for taxes raised as one-fifth of production corresponded to roughly 1.5 tons of gold.
different. First, as mentioned before, slave-owners themselves were of a different kind, but also slaves enjoyed some degree of bargaining power within the relationship. The extent of bad treatment was limited by a series of informational advantages that slaves enjoyed, derived from the close contact between slave and slave-owner and from the very nature of the production technology. Slaves could always denounce their owners for tax frauds, which were a widespread problem for the Portuguese authorities. In reality, even though rarely used, the Portuguese crown instituted a legislation according to which slaves could gain freedom by denouncing tax evasion (Reis, 2005) . Such accusations could bring serious problems to miners even when unfounded (Costa, 1982a) . In addition, production itself implied a huge degree of informational asymmetry between slaves and slave-owners or supervisors. Slaves could always steal or hide whatever they found, and miners depended on their willingness to report discoveries in order for the enterprise to be profitable (Reis, 2005) .
The unusual relationship between slave and slave-owner led to the formation of a very particular social structure during the gold cycle. It became relatively common for slaves to buy their own freedom. Initially, this was achieved through the use of stolen gold, but soon the work system evolved into an incentive compatible set of rules, where slaves could work on their own for part of the time, paying a fixed fraction of whatever they found to the owners. The fraction of freed slaves among the population of African descent, which amounted to only 1.4% between 1735 and 1749, increased to 41% by 1786 (34% of the total population; Russell-Wood, 1977).
The gold-cycle, therefore, was associated with the development of a relatively horizontal society. Nevertheless, the emergence of this society was intrinsically connected to a rent-seeking activity and took place under the overreaching and bureaucratically oppressive centralization of the Portuguese state.
Long-Run Implications of Colonial Cycles
By setting the initial conditions in terms of distribution of economic and political power, and effectiveness of the machine of government and of the legal system, these rent-seeking episodes of colonial times created the environment from which the entire institutional history of the affected areas evolved. Given the tendency towards persistency of institutions discussed in both the empirical and theoretical literature (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001 and 2002 , and Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001 , for example), these initial conditions may have had effects that can be still perceived today.
In this respect, despite their similarities, there are important distinguishing features when we compare the sugar-cane and gold cycles. In the sugar-cane cycle, production technologies led to an extremely polarized society, with economic and political power concentrated in the hands of local leaders who suffered very little interference from any type of central power, and were subject to almost no constraint from external sources (Reis, 2005) . The figure of these local leaders appeared throughout Latin America as syntheses of the political landscape created by the agricultural society of colonial times. Their heirs survived well into the 20 th century, in the figures of the "Coronel" in Brazil and the "Caudillo" in Spanish America (see, for example, Schwartz, 1987) .
Economic and political power was closely related to initial concentration of land and to the persistence of this concentration through time. In Brazil, the highly concentrated land distribution today has its deep roots in the colonization process (see Leal, 1997 and Assunção, 2006) . In the areas involved in sugar production, ownership of land meant economic power, which in turn meant actual political power. In the end, this power may have manifested itself in different forms: through the formal absence of the state in areas initially under the influence of planters; through the control of the formal political system by the main economic players; or maybe simply through the overruling of state power and de jure institutions by economic power and de facto institutions ran by local elites.
The social and political structures associated with the gold cycle were very different.
Though slavery and inequality were common factors, the social structure was less rigid, and the distribution of endowments and political power across the civil population was more equal. But particularly striking was the presence of an over-controlling and bureaucratically suffocating central power. The desperate efforts of the Portuguese crown to monitor every single step of the production and trade of precious metals led to an overgrown and extremely inefficient government apparatus, involved in a constant struggle against civil society itself. Quite possibly, these were also associated with the ineffective functioning of the government in other areas, and with the development of a culture of detachment between population and state. Therefore, the implications of the gold cycle are likely to be related to the effectiveness of government and to the relation between local population and state power.
In the next section, we describe in detail our empirical strategy and the construction of the historical variables used to identify the long-term effects of the sugar-cane and gold cycles. We also discuss how the specific institutional variables used in the analysis relate to the different dimensions of institutional development discussed in this section.
Empirical Strategy and Data
This section presents the data used in our analysis and discusses our empirical strategy.
All variables are defined at the municipality level. Complete and detailed descriptions are contained in the appendix.
Historical Variables
We study the colonial determinants of current institutions based on the fact that: (i) it is possible to identify the sugar-cane and gold cycles in time and geographic location; and (ii) distance to Portugal was an important determinant of the actual degree of intervention imposed by the metropolis.
We first identify current municipalities that are located in areas that were directly affected by the colonial cycles. In the case of sugar-cane, municipalities are identified from information contained in the historical literature and from their years of foundation. Based on Simonsen Campos dos Goytacazes, in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Nevertheless, there is no precise information on the distribution of sugar-cane production within these states and regions during colonial times. Therefore, we use the year of foundation of municipalities in order to identify localities that had their origins connected to the sugar-cane cycle. Specifically, we define a municipality as being directly affected by the sugar-cane cycle if it is located in one of the areas enumerated above, and was founded before 1760.
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In the case of gold, identification of municipalities is somewhat easier. Based on historical accounts (for example, Russel-Wood, 1977 , Simonsen, 1937 , Boxer, 2000 , and Fausto, 2006 , we can determine the current states that had areas directly involved in the gold cycle (Bahia, Goiás, Mato Grosso, and Minas Gerais). Using the historical map presented in Simonsen (1937, "Caminhos Antigos, Mineração e Máxima Expansão da Capitania Paulista"), we can delimitate the precise location of the mining areas within each of these states. 13 We then define as municipalities directly affected by the gold cycle those located in these areas today.
12 Results remain unchanged if we define the sugar-cane cycle as corresponding only to the period of most intense sugar activity, ranging from 1536 to 1700. 13 Results also remain virtually unchanged when we use all the mining areas presented in the historical map (Simonsen, 1937) , including some small areas in the Southeastern and North parts of the country that are usually not thought to be directly associated with the gold cycle.
From the above definitions, we construct two dummy variables assuming value one if a municipality was directly affected by the respective colonial cycle. Yet, the influence of these historical episodes was not restricted to municipalities directly affected by them. Sugar-cane and gold production and processing were not entirely concentrated in these locations. Similarly, the political and social structures associated with these episodes most likely had a broader geographic influence. In order to capture this continuous pattern, we define, for each municipality and each colonial cycle, the following influence function: 
where d i is the distance from municipality i to the closest municipality directly involved in the respective cycle.
This function gives more weight to municipalities closer to locations directly affected by the rent-seeking episodes, and decays in a quadratic fashion until it reaches zero in a 200 kilometer ray. This influence function varies between 0 and 1 according to the profile described in Figure 4 . The figure also presents the profile of three alternative influence functions used in our robustness analysis. These alternative functions consider different thresholds for the same function (100 and 300 kilometers), and a discontinuous dummy variable assuming value 1 within a 50 kilometer ray. Results are not sensitive to the particular specification chosen for the influence function.
In summary, we create two variables -sugar and gold -indicating the influence of the respective cycles in each municipality (varying between 1 and 0 in a 200 kilometer ray, according to equation (1)). In addition to the indices of influence of the sugar-cane and gold cycles, we use distance to Portugal to incorporate the active interference of the metropolis during the colonial period. As stressed in the historical discussion, distance to Lisbon represented important administrative costs that ultimately affected the efficacy of the institutional apparatus of rent extraction.
14 We define distance to Portugal (dist to Portugal) as the Euclidian distance between each municipality and Lisbon (38º42'N, 9ºW). Our ideal measure of distance would include transportation costs or time by sea and land during colonial times, but this type of information is simply impossible to obtain for the vast majority of Brazilian municipalities. Despite the fact that our measure may not be ideal, we believe that it is highly correlated with travel distance, even more so because our geographic controls will also include distance to the coast.
Our main interest in relation to distance to Portugal rests on the way it affected the intervention of the metropolis during the rent seeking episodes. For this reason, we also consider the interaction between distance to Portugal and the sugar-cane and gold influence functions. We hope that this interaction will capture variation in the degree of control exercised by the metropolis within the cycles (sugar x dist to Portugal and gold x dist to Portugal).
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We thus have five historical variables that can be used to understand the long-term determinants of variations in local institutions: sugar, gold, dist to Portugal, sugar x dist to Portugal and gold x dist to Portugal.
Institutional Variables
The sugar-cane and gold colonial cycles may have affected distinct dimensions of the institutional framework in Brazil. In order to account for the various potential long-run implications, we consider four indicators of current institutional development.
The first two institutional variables capture the distribution of resources and political power within municipalities. As pointed out by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) , even if not directly allocated to formal political institutions, individuals may exert political power. In this sense, the concentration of economic resources in the hands of an elite acts as a source of de facto political power. Thus, an environment of high concentration of economic power may determine poor de facto political institutions irrespectively of the formalities of the de jure institutional setting.
First, we look for a measure of inequality in the distribution of endowments as affecting initial distribution of economic power. We use the Gini coefficient of distribution of land, since agriculture played a key historical role in shaping political forces in Brazil. Ideally, we would like a measure of concentration of land at some historical point in time, but this type of information is not available at the municipality level. In addition, land concentration today is thought to be representative of the historical past, given that its genesis date back to the colonial period (Leal, 1997 and Assunção, 2006) . So we use the Gini coefficient of distribution of land, computed for each municipality based on the 1996 Brazilian Agricultural Census (land Gini). instruments. 16 It is constructed as the simple average of four qualitative indicators, normalized from 1 to 6: the year in which the database of the tax on urban property ("IPTU") was updated, 16 A complete description of the methodology used to compute the index can be found in IBGE (2001) . Some of the components of this index seem better than others for our purposes. Nevertheless, in order to adopt an agnostic approach and trust entirely on an indicator whose conception is exogenous to this study, we focus on the index created by the Brazilian Census Bureau. The same comment applies to the index of access to justice that will be introduced later on. In section 6, we replicate our main exercises for each component of these indices separately.
the IPTU payment rate, the number of administrative instruments, 17 and the number of planning instruments. 18 The index (governance) is calculated using data between 1997 and 2000.
The last institutional variable measures the penetration of the rule of law at the local level. Formally, there is no municipal judicial system in Brazil. Any court or justice commission in a municipality is either related to the local executive or to the state judicial system. Consumidor").
Nevertheless
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Our four measures of institutional quality -land Gini, political concentration, governance, and access to justice -cover different aspects of the de facto institutional environment in Brazilian municipalities. In addition to identifying this dimension of institutional variation in a way that is not possible in cross-country comparisons, these variables are also more concrete measures of institutional quality than those typically seen in the empirical literature (see the Appendix for detailed definitions and sources).
Other Variables
Additional variables used in our empirical analysis are briefly enumerated in this section.
We use, for various purposes, the following variables constructed from the 2000 census files: income per capita, years of schooling (average for the population aged 25 and above), 17 Computed as the average of binary variables indicating the existence of: (i) City Administrative Districts, (ii) Submunicipal Administrative Centers, (iii) Urban Plan ("Plano Diretor"), (iv) Law of Soil Use and Division ("Lei de Parcelamento do Solo" or equivalent), (v) Zoning Law ("Lei de Zoneamento" or equivalent), (vi) Building Code ("Código de Obras"), and (vii) Code of Administrative Conduct ("Código de Posturas"). 18 Computed as the average of binary variables indicating the existence of: (i) administrative plan ("Plano de Governo"), (ii) strategic plan ("Plano Estratégico") and (iii) municipal organic law ("Lei Orgânica"). 19 Small Claims Courts deal with civil cases with relatively low complexity and involving small amounts of money. These special courts aim at determining the rights of the litigants based on merits and avoiding the high costs and long waiting time of the traditional justice system. Youth Councils were designed to promote human development and protect the rights of young people. Even though they are not directly related to the issues discussed in the paper, they reveal an interesting dimension of variation in de facto institutions: in 2000, despite being mandatory according to the constitution, they were present in only 68 percent of the municipalities. Consumer Commissions comprise different institutions of protection of consumer rights, with actions covering a wide range of topics including product liability, fraud, misrepresentation, and other consumer-business interactions.
illiteracy rate, and population. From the Brazilian Census Bureau, we obtain data on area, age (year of foundation), and coordinates of each municipality. A detailed description of these variables and their sources is contained in the appendix.
Our set of geographic variables, obtained from various different sources (see appendix), is given by: distance to equator (absolute value of the latitude), distance to coast, rainfall, sunshine, altitude, temperatures (12 monthly averages), and soils (14 dummy variables for the types of soil present in a 0.1 degree ray around the municipality's official center).
In order to illustrate the degree of detail of these geographic controls, Table 1 presents a series of descriptive results, already referred to in the introduction, related to the pattern of development within Brazil. In the first five columns, we regress income per capita (ln) and our four measures of institutional quality on the complete set of geographic variables. The geographic pattern of economic and institutional development within Brazil is clear: distance to the equator, rainfall, sunshine, average temperatures, and types of soil are all significantly related to both economic and institutional development. Geography alone explains 65, 30, and 20 percent of the variation in, respectively, ln income per capita, governance, and land Gini. In the last column, we add the institutional variables as additional controls in a regression where income per capita is the dependent variable. Municipalities with better governance, more access to justice, less political concentration, and lower land Gini's have typically higher income per capita. The inclusion of the institutional variables increases substantially the explanatory power of the regression, despite the already high R 2 registered in column 1 (the fraction of the variation explained by the model increases to 74 percent). Nevertheless, endogeneity between institutional and economic development prevents any causal interpretation of these results. In the next section, we describe how our empirical strategy tries to deal with this problem.
Finally, Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for the areas directly affected by the sugar-cane and gold cycles, and also for the rest of the country. Not surprisingly, the sugar-cane area, which is located in the Northeast region, is on average poorer and less developed than the rest of Brazil. 20 Maybe more surprising is how close the areas directly affected by the gold cycle summarize the level of development observed in Brazil as a whole.
Empirical Strategy
Our empirical analysis can be divided in two steps. First, we investigate the long-run determinants of institutions, analyzing whether the historical episodes from the colonial period explain current variation in local institutions. Following, the sugar-cane and gold cycles, together 20 The Northeastern part of Brazil contains some of the poorest areas of the country.
with distance to Portugal, are used as sources of variation to identify the effect of current institutions on local development.
In the first set of empirical exercises, we estimate the following specification for each municipality i : 
For good institutional characteristics, 0 < 
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we evaluate whether municipality-level institutions are significant determinants of income per capita. In principle, we could infer a direct causation from the last column in Table 1 . However, there are well-known identification problems related to reverse causation, omitted variables, and measurement error.
Reverse causation tends to introduce a positive bias in direct inferences about the relationship between institutions and income per capita. Not only better economic institutions increase income per capita, but also richer municipalities may demand and be able to afford better institutions. For the case of omitted variables and measurement error, it is not possible to tell a priori the direction of the bias. The dimension of the measurement error independent from other right-hand side variables generates an attenuation bias, bringing the estimated effect of institutions closer to zero.
Our strategy to identify the effect of institutions on income relies on an instrumental variables approach, where the sugar-cane and gold cycles, along with distance to Portugal, are used as sources of variation in current institutional quality. The first-stage specification is given by equation (2), while the second-stage regression is the following (we also show results where distance to Portugal is not treated as an instrument, given the concerns expressed in footnote 14): ν is an error term.
The vector of geographic attributes ( i X ) plays an important role in our analysis. Table 1 shows that there is a significant correlation between institutions and geography in our sample.
When compared to cross-country analyses, municipality-level data allow us to better account for the role of geographic characteristics. Typically, there is much less geographic variation within municipalities than across countries.
Under the assumptions that the historical variables do not belong in equation (5) Table 3 presents the results on the long-term effects of colonial cycles on land Gini, political concentration, governance and access to justice. The first column for each dependent variable presents a regression of the respective institutional variable on the influence of the sugar-cane and gold cycles, while the second column shows the results for the complete specification. All regressions include the whole set of geographic controls.
Colonial Cycles and Current Institutions
Main Results
Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 show that municipalities historically associated with the sugar-cane cycle have more concentration of land, while those associated with the gold cycle display less political concentration and less access to justice. Distance to Portugal is correlated with less political concentration, more access to justice, and worse governance (the latter is only statistically significant at the 10% level). The negative relationship between the gold cycle and political concentration is consistent with the historical accounts that the mining activity led to a more horizontal society, given its production technology. But, as will be seen shortly, this particular result is not robust, so we do not place too much emphasis on it.
These results reflect the comparison between municipalities whose origins trace back to the colonial cycles and other municipalities in the country. However, this strategy does not capture differences within each cycle. In order to take that into account, columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 depict our full specification, where we introduce interactions between the colonial cycle variables and distance to Portugal. Thus, we investigate the relevance of each cycle and, simultaneously, test whether the outcome is affected by the degree of intervention of the metropolis. Municipalities within each cycle are not only compared to those outside the area of influence, but also to other municipalities within the cycle and closer to or further away from Portugal.
In the complete specification, the land Gini increases with the influence of the sugar-cane cycle, and particularly so for areas closer to Portugal (column 2 in Table 3 ). The effects of the sugar-cane and gold cycles on political concentration, on the other hand, cease entirely to be significant. Still, proximity to Portugal alone increases political concentration irrespective of the municipality having been affected by the colonial cycles or not.
The results for governance and access to justice follow a quite different pattern (columns 6 and 8 in Table 3 ). The influence of the gold cycle is systematically associated with worse quality of the local administration and less access to justice. And, as in the case of sugar-cane in relation to concentration of land, the effect of the gold cycle is stronger for municipalities closer to Portugal. In the case of access to justice, distance to Portugal is also positive and statistically significant without the interaction with the gold cycle variable.
Overall, our baseline specification paints a picture remarkably consistent with the historical discussion from Section 2. Areas associated with the sugar-cane cycle display higher concentration of land, which can be related to higher concentration of economic power in a historical perspective. This result can be thought of as a long-term consequence of the polarized society created by the plantation system, with its large rural properties and extensive use of slave labor. Areas historically associated with the gold cycle, on their turn, are particularly distinct today in terms of the poor quality of their governments. These areas are characterized by inefficient governments and lack of provision of access to justice. Again, both these dimensions can be understood as heritages from the oppressive and over-bureaucratic state apparatus created by the Portuguese crown during the mining period. Finally, it is also true that the negative consequences of the sugar-cane and gold cycles seem to have been particularly relevant for municipalities that were geographically closer to Portugal, and therefore were more subject to direct interference from the metropolis. In this sense, our results come not only from the comparison between municipalities inside and outside the influence areas, but also from municipalities within the influence area closer to and further away from Portugal.
Our statistically significant results from Table 3 imply that: if the average city in the historical mining areas had not been affected by the gold cycle, its governance index today would be better by 10% of a standard deviation, while its index of access to justice would improve by 16% of a standard deviation; and if the average municipality in the sugar-cane area had not been affected by the sugar-cane cycle, its index of concentration of land today would be lower by 50% of a standard deviation. Table 4 shows that the results discussed above do not depend on the specific way that we choose to define the area of influence of the rent-seeking colonial cycles, or on the particular distance used in our influence function. In the table, we run the most complete specification from Table 3 for each dependent variable, using three alternative definitions of influence of the colonial cycles: the first one where our decaying influence function is defined on a 300 kilometer ray, instead of the 200 kilometer ray adopted before; another one where the same function is defined on a 100 kilometer ray; and a third one where influence is defined simply as a dummy variable assuming value one within a 50 kilometer ray (an intuitive description of these alternative influence functions was presented before in Figure 6 ). Qualitative results are identical to the ones presented in Table 3 . The only exception is the political concentration variable, which is significantly affected by the gold cycle variable in the definition based on a 300 kilometer ray.
Caveats and Robustness
Quantitatively, results are also very similar when we use the same influence function with a 100 or a 300 kilometer ray, and typically smaller when we define influence as a dummy variable assuming value one within a 50 kilometer ray. Table 5 extends our robustness analysis by including as additional controls municipality characteristics that may be related to colonial cycles and also to current institutions, therefore potentially biasing the results. Some of the municipalities affected by the cycles are among the first colonial settlements of their respective areas, and have become today important regional centers. It may be the case that, because of congestion or returns to scale in the provision of public goods, the institutional dimensions under analysis end up being affected by the size of the municipality. We therefore include two measures of the size of municipalities -population and area -as additional controls (ln(population) and ln(area)). It is also possible that older municipalities are intrinsically different from new ones, and that this correlation is the driving force behind the results. Therefore, we also include as an additional control the age (in years) of municipalities. Finally, in the last three columns of Table 5, 
Current Institutions and Development
Main Results
We now investigate whether the institutional heritage from the colonial period has any noticeable effect on income per capita today. Table 6 Column 5 shows that governance and access to justice remain statistically significant even when introduced together in the same specification (coefficients are reduced by roughly 40 percent). Quantitatively, the coefficients from column 5 imply that an exogenous improvement in governance practices within the municipality administration from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of the observed distribution would lead, in the long-run, to an increase of 83% in income per capita.
An analogous movement of a municipality in the observed distribution of access to justice would lead to an increase of 50% in income per capita. To give some perspective into the relevance of these numbers, the difference in income per capita between municipalities in the 25 th and 75 th percentiles of the income distribution is 170%. The estimated impact of local institutions on development is quantitatively important and of plausible magnitude.
The IV coefficients obtained in column 5 of Table 6 are higher than the respective OLS estimates presented in Table 1 . This is an indication that the IV estimation is minimizing a problem of attenuation bias present in the OLS results, potentially coming from measurement error. Indeed, quantifying institutional arrangements is a hard task, subject to various limitations.
There may be noise in the definition of the variables and even in the institutional aspects they are representing in each different context. Interestingly, the vast majority of cross-country studies have also found IV effects of institutions on development higher than their respective OLS estimates (see discussion of the literature in Pande and Udry, 2006) .
Finally, the inclusion of instrumented institutions as additional controls reduces the role played by some of the main geographic variables discussed in Table 1 . The coefficient on distance to equator, for example, is reduced from 0.064 to 0.028, while the coefficient on rainfall drops from 0.034 to 0.021. At the same time, the F statistic on the joint significance of the twelve monthly temperature variables is reduced from 42.06 to 10.65, while the F statistic on the variables indicating the predominant types of soil drops from 11.99 to 5.65. It does seem to be the case that a significant fraction of the correlation between geography and development across Brazilian municipalities is associated with the different patterns of colonization adopted in distinct regions of the country. Still, our institutional variables are not able to fully account for the geographic pattern of development discussed in the introduction, so we cannot rule out the existence of some causal relationship between endowments and development within Brazil.
Caveats and Robustness
The use of dist to Portugal as an instrument assumes that it does not affect income per capita through other channels than those captured by the institutional variables. As mentioned before, distance to Portugal is also a proxy for distance to European markets. If distance to international markets is correlated with income per capita, distance to Portugal would not be a valid instrument to identify the effect of institutions on long-term development.
The bias in our estimates implied by this argument is negative, meaning that the coefficients presented in Table 6 would underestimate the impact of institutions on development (assuming that being closer to international markets is good for development). In any case, Table 7 replicates the exercise from Table 6 using dist to Portugal as an additional control, rather than an instrument. The results show that the significant effects of the institutional variable, taken separately, on income per capita increase modestly when this change is introduced (as should be expected from the direct effect of distance to Europe on development). The only noticeable change occurs when governance and access to justice are considered jointly: the absence of dist to Portugal as an instrument hinders the ability of the model to distinguish between the effects of governance and access to justice (which become very collinear).
An important critique in relation to studies linking history and current institutional development in the international context was put forth by Glaeser et al (2004) . In their view, the historical events used to identify institutional variation across countries brought together not only changes in institutions, but also changes along several different dimensions relevant to development. Particularly, they highlight that immigrants also brought higher levels of human capital, and that the causal mechanisms described by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001 and 2002) might work just as well through the human capital channel.
In our case, since migration is much more likely within than across countries, there is less of an argument for the persistence of human capital across municipalities. Nonetheless, in order to show that our estimated coefficients are indeed capturing historical forces that work specifically through the institutional channel, we check the robustness of the second stage results to the human capital mechanism. Table 8 presents the results for two measures of human capital (average schooling and illiteracy rates in the population aged 25 and above). For each alternative variable included in the right-hand side, we present results where this new variable is treated as, respectively, exogenous and endogenous to income per capita.
The results remain very similar to those presented in Table 6 . The only exception is the coefficient on access to justice, which ceases to be significant when average schooling is included in the right-hand side and treated as endogenous (the p-value associated with this coefficient is 0.11, and the magnitude of the coefficient is similar to the one presented in the third column). Differently from the results in Glaeser et al (2004) , the institutional variables remain significant even in the presence of human capital, measured in terms of illiteracy or average schooling. Therefore, our results do not seem to be subject to the types of concerns raised by the authors in the context of cross-country studies.
Unbundling Local Institutions
The results presented above highlight the role of governance and access to justice as intervening forces in the relationship between colonial heritage and long-run development. As mentioned before, the indexes of governance and access to justice have different components, some more closely related to the arguments developed in the paper than others. Here, we take advantage of our data and try to identify the specific aspects of governance and access to justice that drive the results from the previous sections.
Section 3 explained that governance is an index comprised of four different measures of quality of local administration: two measures related to tax administration (the year in which the database of the tax on urban property was updated and its payment rate), the number of administrative instruments, and the number of planning instruments. Table 9 replicates the same exercise from Table 6 substituting governance by each of its components. The OLS estimates are presented in column 1, while the IV estimates are reported in columns 2 to 6. The instrumented dimensions of governance related to tax administration are the only ones that appear as significantly related to income per capita. In particular, the date of the last revision of the database on the tax on urban property appears as the most important component of governance.
This variable is related to basic administrative practices at the local level and captures, among other things, the way local governments are organized in order to collect taxes. It is reassuring that our results related to governance are indeed driven by a dimension of the index that denotes administrative efficiency at a very basic and obvious level.
The decomposition of access to justice is presented in Table 10 . As before, access to justice is substituted by each of its components: existence of small claims courts, consumer commissions, and youth councils. Each instrumented dimension of access to justice, when considered separately, is statistically significant (columns 2 to 4). However, when introduced together, the existence of small claims courts is the only one that remains significant (column 5).
Small claims courts, which enforce contracts and protect property rights, appear as the most important component of access to justice in terms of its effects on long-term income per capita.
Also in relation to access to justice, it is reassuring that the strongest result comes from the type of court that indeed affects the way local business and interpersonal disputes are solved.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the long-run determinants of de facto institutions and their effects on development. Current variation in local institutions is traced back to the colonial origins of Brazilian municipalities, in a within country approach. This approach enables us to control for a comprehensive set of geographic characteristics, within a constant de jure institutional setting.
Even after accounting for a broad characterization of geography, de facto institutions appear as closely related to colonial heritage, and as one of the fundamental causes of long-run development.
Our strategy takes advantage of two striking features of our empirical environment. First, the within country analysis allows the investigation of four different dimensions of de facto institutions. Second, the sugar-cane and gold cycles, which were the most important rent-seeking episodes in colonial Brazil, can be used as sources of variation in local institutional development.
Both cycles are relatively well-defined in time and space, were associated with an intensification of the control exercised by the metropolis, and marked the initial occupation of important areas of the country. Thus, we provide different paths through which the influence of extractive colonial episodes can be materialized in terms of current institutions.
The paper contributes to the literature by investigating the long-run determinants and the effects of specific de facto institutions. We show that access to justice, understood as the local availability of courts, and municipal governance, understood as the effectiveness and quality of public administration, are both related to long-term development. Our results give a more concrete connotation to the discussion on the economic role of institutions, suggesting specific improvements that could in principle be pursued in order to foster local development. Obs.: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Dependent variables are income per capita (ln), Gini coefficient of the distribution of land, vote share of the frontrunner in mayoral elections, index of quality of local administration, and indicator of the local presence of three types of courts. Independent variables are absolute value of the latitude, distance from municipality center to the coast (in km), average water precipitation btwn 1931-1990 (100 millimeters per year), average sunshine during the day btwn 1931-1990 (100 hours per year), average altitude, average montly temperatures in each of the 12 months of the year (degrees Celsius), and 14 dummy variables indicating the types of soil present in a 0.1 degree ray from the municipality's center. Institutional variables also used as independent variables in the last specification. Municipality level observations. Variables measured with data available between 1996 and 2000, unless otherwise noted. Obs.: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Dependent variables are Gini coefficient of the distribution of land, vote share of the frontrunner in mayoral elections, index of quality of local administration, and indicator of the local presence of three types of courts. Independent variables are sugar-cane cycle influence index, gold cycle influence index, distance to Portugal (in degrees), and interaction between the cycle influence indices and distance to Portugal. All regressions include as additional independent variables (not shown): constant, absolute value of the latitude, distance from municipality center to the coast (in km), avg water precipitation btwn 1931-1990 (100 millimeters per year), avg sunshine during the day btwn 1931-1990 (100 hours per year), avg altitude, avg montly temperatures in each of the 12 months of the year (degrees Celsius), and 14 dummies indicating the types of soil present in a 0.1 degree ray from the municipality's center. Municipality level observations. Colonial cycle variables described in section 3. Variables measured with data available between 1996 and 2000, unless otherwise noted. Obs.: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Dependent variables are Gini coefficient of the distribution of land, vote share of the frontrunner in mayoral elections, index of quality of local administration, and indicator of the local presence of three types of courts. Independent variables are sugar-cane cycle influence index, gold cycle influence index, distance to Portugal (in degrees), and interaction between the cycle influence indices and distance to Portugal. All regressions include as additional independent variables (not shown): constant, absolute value of the latitude, distance from municipality center to the coast (in km), avg water precipitation btwn 1931-1990 (100 millimeters per year), avg sunshine during the day btwn 1931-1990 (100 hours per year), avg altitude, avg montly temperatures in each of the 12 months of the year (degrees Celsius), and 14 dummies indicating the types of soil present in a 0.1 degree ray from the municipality's center. Municipality level observations. Colonial cycle variables described in section 3. Variables measured with data available between 1996 and 2000, unless otherwise noted. Obs.: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Dependent variables are Gini coefficient of the distribution of land, vote share of the frontrunner in mayoral elections, index of quality of local administration, and indicator of the local presence of three types of courts. Independent variables are sugar-cane cycle influence index, gold cycle influence index, distance to Portugal (in degrees), interaction btwn cycle influence indices and distance to Portugal, population (ln), area in square km (ln), age (years since foundation), and dummies for geographic regions (S, SE, N, NE, CW). All regressions include as additional independent variables (not shown): constant, abs value of latitude, dist to the coast (in km), avg water precipitation btwn 1931-1990 (100 millimeters per year), avg sunshine during the day btwn 1931-1990 (100 hours per year), avg altitude, avg montly temperatures in the 12 months (degrees Celsius), and 14 dummies indicating the types of soil present in a 0.1 degree ray from the municipality's center. Municipality level observations. Colonial cycle variables described in section 3. Variables measured with data available between 1996 and 2000, unless otherwise noted. Obs.: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Dependent variable is income p.c. (ln). Independent variables are Gini coefficient of the distribution of land, vote share of the frontrunner in mayoral elections, index of quality of local administration, and indicator of the local presence of three types of courts. All regressions include as additional independent variables (not shown): constant, abs value of lat, dist to the coast (in km), avg water precipitation btwn 1931-1990 (100 millimeters per year), avg sunshine during the day btwn 1931-1990 (100 hours per year), avg altitude, avg montly temperatures in the 12 months of the year (degrees Celsius), and 14 dummies indicating types of soil present in a 0.1 degree ray from the municipality's center. Instr. are sugar-cane cycle influence index, gold cycle influence index, distance to Portugal (in degrees), and interaction between the cycle indices and dist. to Portugal (1st stage results presented in Table 3 ). Municipality level observations. Variables measured with data available between 1996 and 2000, unless otherwise noted.
(1) Obs.: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Dependent variable is income p.c. (ln). Independent variables are Gini coefficient of the distribution of land, vote share of the frontrunner in mayoral elections, index of quality of local administration, and indicator of the local presence of three types of courts. All regressions include as additional independent variables (not shown): constant, abs value of lat, dist to the coast (in km), avg water precipitation btwn 1931-1990 (100 millimeters per year), avg sunshine during the day btwn 1931-1990 (100 hours per year), avg altitude, avg montly temperatures in the 12 months of the year (degrees Celsius), 14 dummies indicating types of soil present in a 0.1 degree ray from the municipality's center, and distance to Portugal (in degrees). Instr. are sugar-cane cycle influence index, gold cycle influence index, and interaction between the cycle indices and dist. to Portugal (1st stage results presented in Table 3 Obs.: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Dependent variable is income p.c. (ln). Independent variables are Gini coefficient of distribution of land, vote share of the frontrunner in mayoral elections, index of quality of local administration, indicator of the local presence of three types of courts, illiteracy rate and average schooling (pop 25 and above). All regressions include as additional independent variables (not shown): constant, abs value of lat, dist to coast (in km), avg water precipitation btwn 1931-1990 (100 millimeters per year), avg sunshine during the day btwn 1931-1990 (100 hours per year), avg altitude, avg montly temperatures in the 12 months (degrees Celsius), and 14 dummies indicating types of soil present in a 0.1 degree ray from the municipality's center. Instr. are sugar-cane cycle influence index, gold cycle influence index, distance to Portugal (in degrees), and interaction between the cycle indices and dist. to Portugal (1st stage results presented in Table 3 ). Municipality level observations. Variables measured with data available between 1996 and 2000, unless otherwise noted.
Income per Capita illiteracy rate years of schooling Income per Capita Obs.: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Dependent variable is income p.c. (ln). Independent variables are indicator of the update of the tax on urban property database, tax on urban property payment rate, n of administrative instruments used by administration, n of planning instruments, and indicator of the local presence of three types of courts. All regressions include as additional independent variables (not shown): constant, abs value of lat, dist to the coast (in km), avg water precipitation btwn 1931-1990 (100 millimeters per year), avg sunshine during the day btwn 1931-1990 (100 hours per year), avg altitude, avg montly temperatures in the 12 months of the year (degrees Celsius), and 14 dummies indicating types of soil present in a 0.1 degree ray from the municipality's center. Instr. are sugar-cane cycle influence index, gold cycle influence index, distance to Portugal (in degrees), and interaction between the cycle indices and dist. Income per Capita Obs.: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1%. Dependent variable is income p.c. (ln). Independent variables are dummies indicating the presence of small claims courts, consumer comissions, and youth councils, and index of quality of administration. All regressions include as additional independent variables (not shown): constant, abs value of lat, dist to the coast (in km), avg water precipitation btwn 1931-1990 (100 millimeters per year), avg sunshine during the day btwn 1931-1990 (100 hours per year), avg altitude, avg montly temperatures in the 12 months of the year (degrees Celsius), and 14 dummies indicating types of soil present in a 0.1 degree ray from the municipality's center. Instr. are sugar-cane cycle influence index, gold cycle influence index, distance to Portugal (in degrees), and interaction between the cycle indices and dist. to Portugal. Municipality level observations. Variables measured with data available between 1996 and 2000, unless otherwise noted. 
